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Abstract. In the field of Security, process equivalences have been used to char-
acterize various information-hiding properties (for instance secrecy, anonymity
and non-interference) based on the principle that a protocol P with a variable x
satisfies such property if and only if, for every pair of secrets s1 and s2, P [s1/x]
is equivalent to P [s2/x]. We argue that, in the presence of nondeterminism, the
above principle relies on the assumption that the scheduler “works for the ben-
efit of the protocol”, and this is usually not a safe assumption. Non-safe equiv-
alences, in this sense, include complete-trace equivalence and bisimulation. We
present a formalism in which we can specify admissible schedulers and, corre-
spondingly, safe versions of these equivalences. We prove that safe bisimulation
is still a congruence. Finally, we show that safe equivalences can be used to es-
tablish information-hiding properties.
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in computer security is the protection from informa-
tion leaks, namely how to make sure that a system does not reveal, by observations that
can be made during the execution, some information that we wish to maintain secret.
One way to prevent an attacker to infer the secret from the observables is to create
noise, namely to make sure that for every execution in which a given secret produces
a certain observable, there is at least another execution in which a different secret pro-
duces the same observable. In practice this is often done by using randomization, see
for instance the DCNet [10] and the Crowds [23] protocols.
In the literature about the foundations of Computer Security, however, the quanti-
tative aspects are often abstracted away, and probabilistic behavior is replaced by non-
deterministic behavior. Correspondingly, there have been various approaches in which
information-hiding properties are expressed in terms of equivalences based on nonde-
terminism, especially in a concurrent setting. For instance, [24] defines anonymity as
follows1: A protocol S is anonymous if, for every pair of culprits a and b, S[a/x] and
S[b/x] produce the same observable traces. A similar definition is given in [1] for se-
crecy, with the difference that S[a/x] and S[b/x] are required to be bisimilar. In [13],
an electoral system S preserves the confidentiality of the vote if for any voters v and
w, the observable behavior of S is the same if we swap the votes of v and w. Namely,
S[a/v |b /w] ∼ S[b/v |a /w], where ∼ represents bisimilarity.
? This work has been partially supported by the project ANR-09-BLAN-0169-01 PANDA and
by the INRIA DRI Equipe Associe´e PRINTEMPS.
1 The actual definition of [24] is more complicated, but the spirit is the same.
These proposals are based on the implicit assumption that all the nondeterministic
executions present in the specification of S will always be possible under every imple-
mentation of S. Or at least, that the adversary will believe so. In concurrency, however,
as argued in [8], nondeterminism has a rather different meaning: if a specification S
contains some nondeterministic alternatives, typically it is because we want to abstract
from specific implementations, such as the scheduling policy. A specification is consid-
ered correct, with respect to some property, if every alternative satisfies the property.
Correspondingly, an implementation is considered correct if all executions are among
those possible in the specification, i.e. if the implementation is a refinement of the spec-
ification. There is no expectation that the implementation will actually make possible
all the alternatives indicated by the specification.
We argue that the use of nondeterminism in concurrency corresponds to a demonic
view: the scheduler, i.e. the entity that will decide which alternative to select, may try
to choose the worst alternative. Hence we need to make sure that “all alternatives are
good”, i.e. satisfy the intended property. In the above mentioned approaches to the for-
malization of security properties, on the contrary, the interpretation of nondeterminism
is angelic: the scheduler is expected to actually help the protocol to confuse the adver-
sary and thus protect the secret information.
There is another issue, orthogonal to the angelic/demonic dichotomy, but relevant
for the achievement of security properties: the scheduler should not be able to make
its choices dependent on the secret, or else nearly every protocol would be insecure,
i.e. the scheduler would always be able to leak the secret to an external observer (for
instance by producing different interleavings of the observables, depending on the se-
cret). This remark has been made several times already, and several approaches have
been proposed to cope with the problem of full-information scheduler (aka almighty,
omniscient, clairvoyant, etc.), see for example [6,7,9,8,3].
The risk of a naive use of nondeterminism to specify a security property, is not only
that it may rely on an implicit assumption that the scheduler behaves angelically, but
also that it is clairvoyant (fully-informed), i.e. that it peeks at the secrets (that it is not
supposed to be able to see) to achieve its angelic strategy.
Example 1. Consider the following system, in a CCS-like syntax: S def= (c)(A ‖ H1 ‖
H2 ‖ Corr), with A def= c〈sec〉, H1 def= c(s).out〈a〉, H2 def= c(s).out〈b〉, Corr def=
c(s).out〈s〉. Here ‖ is the parallel operator, c〈sec〉 is a process that sends sec on channel
c, c(s).P is a process that receives s on channel c and then continues as P , and (c) is the
restriction operator, enforcing synchronization on c. The name sec represents a secret.
It is easy to see that we have S [a/sec] ∼ S
[
b/sec
]
. Note that, in order to simulate
the third branch in S [a/sec], the process S
[
b/sec
]
needs to select its first branch. Vicev-
ersa, in order to simulate the third branch in S
[
b/sec
]
, the process S [a/sec] needs to
select its second branch. This means that, in order to achieve bisimulation, the scheduler
needs to know the secret, and change its choice accordingly.
This example shows a system that intuitively is not secure, because the third compo-
nent, Corr , reveals whatever secret it receives. However, according to the equivalence-
based notions of security discussed above, it is secure. But it is secure thanks to a
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scheduler that angelically helps the system to protect the secret, and it does so by mak-
ing its choices dependent on the secret. We consider these assumptions on the scheduler
excessively strong.
We do not claim, however, that we should rule out the use of angelic nondetermin-
ism in security: on the contrary, angelic nondeterminism can be a powerful specification
concept. We only advocate a cautious use of this notion. In particular, it should not be
used in a context in which the scheduler may be in collusion with the attacker. The goal
of this paper is to define a framework in which we can combine both angelic and de-
monic nondeterminism in a setting in which also probabilistic behavior may be present,
and in a context in which the scheduler is restricted (i.e. not fully-informed). We define
“safe” variant of typical equivalence relations (complete traces and bisimulation), and
we show how to use them to characterize information-hiding properties.
1.1 Contribution
The main novelties of our work can be articulated as follows:
• We propose a formalism for concurrent systems which accounts for both probabilis-
tic and nondeterministic behaviour, and in which the latter is of two kinds: global
and local. The first represents the possible interleavings produced by the parallel
components, which may be influenced by the attacker. The second is associated to
the possible choices internal to each component, which may depend on the secrets
or other unknown parameters, not controlled by the attacker. Correspondingly, we
split the scheduler in two constituents: global and local. The latter is actually a tuple
of local schedulers, one for each component of the system.
• We propose a notion of admissible scheduler for the above systems, in which the
global constituent is not allowed to see the secrets, and each local constituent is
not allowed to see any information about the other components. We then generalize
the standard definition of strong (probabilistic) information hiding (such as no-
interference and strong anonymity) to the case in which also nondeterminism is
present, under the assumption that the schedulers are admissible.
• We use admissible schedulers to define safe versions of complete-trace equivalence
and bisimilarity especially tuned for security (in this paper we often refer to com-
plete traces as simply traces). This means that we account for the possibility that the
global constituent of the scheduler is in collusion with the attacker, and therefore
does not necessarily help the system to obfuscate the secret. We show that the latter
is still a congruence, like in the classical case.
• We finally show that our notions of safe trace equivalence and bisimilarity imply
strong information hiding in the above sense.
2 Probabilistic Automata
In this section we gather preliminary notions and results related to probabilistic au-
tomata [26,25].
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A function µ : Q → [0, 1] is a discrete probability distribution on a set Q if the
support of µ is countable and
∑
q∈Q µ(q) = 1. The set of all discrete probability distri-
butions on Q is denoted by D(Q).
A probabilistic automaton is a quadruple M = (Q,Σ, qˆ, α) where Q is a countable
set of states,Σ a finite set of actions, qˆ the initial state, and α is a transition function α :
Q→ P(Σ×D(Q)). HereP(X) is the set of all finite subsets ofX . If α(q) = ∅ then q is
a terminal state. We write q a→ µ for (a, µ) ∈ α(q). Moreover, we write q a→r whenever
q
a→ µ and µ(r) > 0. A fully probabilistic automaton is a probabilistic automaton
satisfying |α(q)| ≤ 1 for all states. In case α(q) 6= ∅ in a fully probabilistic automaton,
we will overload notation and use α(q) to denote the distribution outgoing from q. A
path in a probabilistic automaton is a sequence σ = q0
a1→ q1 a2→ · · · where qi ∈ Q,
ai ∈ Σ and qiai+1−→qi+1. A path can be finite in which case it ends with a state. A path is
complete if it is either infinite or finite ending in a terminal state. Given a path σ, first(σ)
denotes its first state, and if σ is finite then last(σ) denotes its last state. Let Pathsq(M)
denote the set of all paths, Paths?q(M) the set of all finite paths, and CPathsq(M) the
set of all complete paths of an automaton M , starting from the state q. We will omit q
if q = qˆ. Paths are ordered by the prefix relation, which we denote by ≤. The trace of
a path is the sequence of actions in Σ∞ = Σ∗ ∪ Σω obtained by removing the states,
hence for the above path σ we have trace(σ) = a1a2 . . .. We denote by Traces(M) the
complete traces of M , i.e. Traces(M) def= {trace(σ) | σ ∈ CPaths(M)}. If Σ′ ⊆ Σ,
then traceΣ′(σ) is the projection of trace(σ) on the elements of Σ′.
Let M = (Q,Σ, qˆ, α) be a (fully) probabilistic automaton, q ∈ Q a state, and let
σ ∈ Paths?q(M) be a finite path starting in q. The cone generated by σ is the set of
complete paths 〈σ〉 = {σ′ ∈ CPathsq(M) | σ ≤ σ′}. Given a fully probabilistic
automaton M = (Q,Σ, qˆ, α) and a state q, we can calculate the probability value,
denoted byPq(σ), of any finite path σ starting in q as follows:Pq(q) = 1 andPq(σ
a→
q′) = Pq(σ)·µ(q′), where last(σ) a→ µ. LetΩq def= CPathsq(M) be the sample space,
and let Fq be the smallest σ-algebra generated by the cones. Then Pq induces a unique
probability measure on Fq (which we will also denote by Pq) such that Pq(〈σ〉) =
Pq(σ) for every finite path σ starting in q. For q = qˆ we write P instead of Pqˆ .
A scheduler for a probabilistic automaton M is a function ζ : Paths?(M)→ (Σ ×
D(Q)∪ {⊥}) such that for all finite path σ, if α(last(σ)) 6= ∅ then ζ(σ) ∈ α(last(σ)),
and ζ(σ) = ⊥ otherwise. Hence, a scheduler ζ selects one of the available transitions in
each state, and determines therefore a fully probabilistic automaton, obtained by prun-
ing from M the alternatives that are not chosen by ζ. A scheduler is history dependent
since it takes into account the path and not only the current state. It may be partial, i.e.
it may halt the execution at any time 2.
3 Systems
In this section we describe the kind of systems we are dealing with. We start by intro-
ducing a variant of probabilistic automata, that we call Tagged Probabilistic Automata
2 In this paper, however, we will consider only total schedulers, to be more in line with the
standard semantics of CCS.
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(TPA). These systems are parallel compositions of probabilistic processes, called com-
ponents. Each component is equipped with a unique identifier, called tag. Whenever
a component (or a pair of components in case of synchronization) makes a step, the
corresponding transition will be decorated with the associated tag (or pair of tags).
Similar systems have been already introduced in [3]. The main differences are that
here the components may contain nondetermism, and a secret can label any transition.
3.1 Tagged Probabilistic Automata
We now formalize the notion of TPA.
Definition 1. A Tagged Probabilistic Automaton is a tuple (Q,L,Σ, qˆ, α), where Q
is a set of states, L is a set of tags, Σ is a set of actions, qˆ ∈ Q is the initial state,
α : Q→ P(L×Σ ×D(Q)) is a transition function.
In the following we write q l:a−→ µ for (`, a, µ) ∈ α(q), and we use enab(q)
to denote the tags of the components that are enabled to make a transition. Namely,
enab(q)
def
= {` ∈ L | there exists a ∈ Σ,µ ∈ D(Q) such that q l:a−→ µ}. In these
systems, we can decompose the scheduler in two: a global scheduler, which decides
which component or pair of components makes the move next, and a local scheduler,
which solves the internal nondeterminism of the selected component.
We assume that the local scheduler can only select enabled transitions, and that the
global scheduler can only select enabled components. This means that the execution
does not stop unless all components are blocked. This is in line with the tradition of pro-
cess algebra and of Markov Decision Processes, but contrasts with that of Probabilistic
Automata [26]. However, the results in this paper do not depend on this assumption.
Definition 2. Let M = (Q,L,Σ, qˆ, α) be a Tagged Probabilistic Automaton.
• A global scheduler for M is a function ζ : Paths?(M)→ (L ∪ {⊥}) such that for
all finite paths σ, if enab(last(σ)) 6= ∅ then ζ(σ) ∈ enab(last(σ)), and ζ(σ) = ⊥
otherwise.
• A local scheduler for M is a function ξ : Paths?(M) → (L × Σ × D(Q) ∪ {⊥})
such that, for all finite paths σ, if α(last(σ)) 6= ∅ then ξ(σ) ∈ α(last(σ)), and
ξ(σ) = ⊥ otherwise.
• A global scheduler ζ and a local scheduler ξ for M are compatible if, for all finite
paths σ, ξ(σ) = (`, a, µ) implies ζ(σ) = `, and ξ(σ) = ⊥ implies ζ(σ) = ⊥.
• A scheduler is a pair (ζ, ξ) of compatible global and local schedulers.
3.2 Components
We are going to use a simple probabilistic process calculus (a sort of probabilistic ver-
sion of CCS [20,21]) to specify the components.
We assume a set of actions or channel namesΣ with elements a, a1, a2, · · · , includ-
ing the special symbol τ denoting a silent step. Except τ , each action a has a co-action
a¯ ∈ Σ and we assume a¯ = a. Components are specified by the following grammar:
q ::= 0 | a.q | q1 + q2 |
∑
i
pi : qi | q1|q2 | (a)q | A
5
The constructs 0, a.q, q1 + q2, q1|q2 and (a)q represent termination, prefixing, non-
deterministic choice, parallel composition, and the restriction operator, respectively.∑
i pi : qi is a probabilistic choice, where pi represents the probability of the i-th
branch and must satisfy 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and
∑
i pi = 1. The process call A is a simple
process identifier. For each identifier, we assume a corresponding unique process dec-
laration of the form A def= q. The idea is that, whenever A is executed, it triggers the
execution of q. Note that q can contain A or another process identifier, which means
that our language allows (mutual) recursion. We will denote by f n(q) the free channel
names occurring in q, i.e. the channel names not bound by a restriction operator.
Components’ semantics: The operational semantics consists of probabilistic transitions
of the form q a→µ where q ∈ Q is a process, a ∈ Σ is an action and µ ∈ D(Q) is a
distribution on processes. They are specified by the following rules:
PRF
a.q
a→ δq
NDT
q1
a→ µ
q1 + q2
a→ µ
PRB ∑
i pi : qi
τ→ ◦∑i pi · δqi PAR
q1
a→ µ
q1 | q2 a→ µ | q2
CALL
q
a→ µ
A
a→ µ
if Adef= q COM
q1
a→ δr1 q2 a¯→ δr2
q1 | q2 τ→ δr1|r2
RST
q
a→ µ
(b)q
a→ (b)µ
a,a¯6=b
We assume also the symmetric versions of the rules NDT, PAR and COM. The symbol
δq is the delta of Dirac, which assigns probability 1 to q and 0 to all other processes. The
symbol ◦∑i is the summation on distributions. Namely, ◦∑i pi · µi is the distribution µ
such that µ(x) =
∑
i pi · µi(x). The notation µ | q represents the distribution µ′ such
that µ′(r) = µ(q′) if r = q′ | q, and µ′(r) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, (b)µ represents the
distribution µ′ such that µ′(q) = µ(q′) if q = (b)q′, and µ′(q) = 0 otherwise.
3.3 Systems
A system has the form (A) q1 ‖ q2 ‖ · · · ‖ qn, where the qi’s are components and
A ⊆ Σ. The restriction on A enforces synchronization on the channel names belonging
to A, in accordance with the CCS spirit.
Systems’ semantics The semantics of a system gives rise to a TPA, where the states
are terms representing systems during their evolution. A transition now is of the form
q
`:a−→ µ where a ∈ Σ, µ ∈ D(Q), and ` ∈ L is either the tag of the component
which makes the move, or a (unordered) pair of tags representing the two partners of a
synchronization. We can simply define L as L = I ∪ I2 where I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Interleaving
qi
a→ ◦∑j pj · δqij
(A) q1 ‖ · · · ‖ qi ‖ · · · ‖ qj ‖ · · · ‖ qn i:a−→ ◦
∑
j pj · δ(A)q1‖···‖qij‖···‖qn
a 6∈A
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where i is the tag indicating that the component i is making the step. Note that we
assume that probabilistic choices are finite. This implies that every transition q `:a−→ µ
can be written q `:a−→ ◦∑i pi · δqi , and justifies the notation used in the interleaving rule.
Synchronization
qi
a→ δq′i qj
a¯→ δq′j
(A) q1 ‖ · · · ‖ qi ‖ · · · ‖ qj ‖ · · · ‖ qn {i,j}:τ−→ δ(A)q1‖···‖q′i‖···‖q′j‖···‖qn
here {i, j} is the tag indicating that the components making the step are i and j. Note
that it is an unordered pair. Sometimes we will write i, j instead of {i, j}, for simplicity.
Example 2. Consider the systems of Example 1. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the TPAs
of S [a/sec] and of S
[
b/sec
]
respectively. For simplicity we do not write the restriction
on channels c and out, and the termination symbol 0. We use ’−’ to denote a component
that is stuck. The corresponding tags are indicated in the figure with numbers above the
components. The set of enabled transitions should be clear from the figures. For in-
stance, we have enab(S
[
b/sec
]
) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}} and enab( − || out〈a〉 || −
|| − ) = {2}. The scheduler ζ defined as
ζ(σ)
def
=

{1, 4} if σ = S [a/sec] ,
2 if σ = S [a/sec]
1,2:τ−→ ( − || out〈a〉 || − || − ),
3 if σ = S [a/sec]
1,3:τ−→ ( − || − || out〈b〉 || − ),
4 if σ = S [a/sec]
1,4:τ−→ ( − || − || − || out〈a〉 ),
⊥ otherwise,
is a global scheduler for S [a/sec].
1 2 3 4
c〈a〉 || c(s).out〈a〉 || c(s).out〈b〉 || c(s).out〈s〉
− || out〈a〉 || − || − − || − || out〈b〉 || − − || − || − || out〈a〉
− || − || − || − − || − || − || − − || − || − || −
{1, 2} :τ
{1, 3} :τ
{1, 4} :τ
2:out〈a〉 3:out〈b〉 4:out〈a〉
1(a)
1 2 3 4
c〈b〉 || c(s).out〈a〉 || c(s).out〈b〉 || c(s).out〈s〉
− || out〈a〉 || − || − − || − || out〈b〉 || − − || − || − || out〈b〉
− || − || − || − − || − || − || − − || − || − || −
{1, 2} :τ
{1, 3} :τ
{1, 4} :τ
2:out〈a〉 3:out〈b〉 4:out〈b〉
1(b)
Fig. 1. Automata S [a/sec] and S
[
b/sec
]
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4 Admissible schedulers
In this section we restrict the discerning power of the global and local schedulers in
order to avoid the problem of the information leakage induced in security by clairvoyant
schedulers. We impose two kinds of restrictions: For the global scheduler, following
[3], we assume that it can only see, and keep memory of, the observable actions and
the components that are enabled, but not the secret actions. As for the local scheduler,
we assume that the local nondeterminism of each component is solved on the basis of
the view of the history local to that component, i.e. the projection of the history of the
system on that component. In other words, each component has to make decisions based
only on the history of its own execution; it cannot see anything of the other components.
4.1 Restricting Global Schedulers
We assume that the set of actions Σ is divided in two parts, the secret actions S and
the observable actions O. The secret actions are supposed to be invisible to the global
scheduler. Formally, this can be achieved using a function sift with sift(a) equals τ if
a ∈ S and equals a otherwise. Then, we restrict the power of the global scheduler by
forcing it to make the same decisions on paths he cannot tell apart.
Definition 3. Given a TPA M , a global scheduler ζ for M is admissible if for all paths
σ1 and σ2 we have t(σ1) = t(σ2) implies ζ(σ1) = ζ(σ2), where t
(
qˆ
l1:a1−→ q1 l2:a2−→ · · ·
ln:an−→ qn+1
)
def
= (enab(qˆ), sift(a1), l1)(enab(q1), sift(a2), l2)· · ·(enab(qn), sift(an), ln).
The idea is that t sifts the information of the path that the scheduler can see. Since
sift “hides” the secrets, the scheduler cannot take different decisions based on secrets.
4.2 Restricting Local Schedulers
The restriction on the local scheduler is based on the idea that a step of the component i
of a system can only be based on the view that i has of the history, i.e. its own history. In
order to formalize this restriction, it is convenient to introduce the concept of i-view of
a path σ, or projection of σ on i, which we will denote by σi. We define it inductively:
(σ
`:a−→ µ)i =

σi
i:b−→ δqi if ` = {i, j} and µ = δ(A) q1‖...‖qi‖...‖qj‖...‖qn
σi
i:a−→ µ if ` = i
σi otherwise
In the above definition, the first line represents the case of a synchronization step
involving the component i, where we assume that the premise for i is of the form
q′i
b−→ δqi . The second line represents an interleaving step in which i is the active
component. The third line represents step in which the component i is idle.
The restriction to the local scheduler can now be expressed as follows:
Definition 4. Given a TPAM and a local scheduler ξ forM , we say that ξ is admissible
if for all paths σ and σ′, if ξ(σ) = (`, a, µ), and ξ(σ′) = (`′, a′, µ′) we have:
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• if ` = `′ = i and σi = σ′i, then ξ(σ) = ξ(σ′),
• if ` = `′ = {i, j}, σi = σ′i, and σj = σ′j then ξ(σ) = ξ(σ′).
A pair of compatible schedulers (ζ, ξ) is called admissible if ζ and ξ are admissible.
5 Safe equivalences
In this section we revise process equivalence notions to make them safe for security.
5.1 Safe Complete Traces
We define here a safe version of complete-trace semantics. The idea is that we compare
two processes based not only on their traces, but also on the choices that the global
scheduler makes at every step. We do this by recording explicitly the tags in the traces.
Definition 5.
• Given a TPA M = (Q,L,Σ, qˆ, α), the (complete) safe traces of M , denoted here
by Tracess, are defined as the probabilities of sequences of tags and actions corre-
sponding to all possible complete executions, i.e.
Tracess(M) = { f : (L×Σ)∞ → [0, 1] |
there exists an admissible scheduler (ζ, ξ) s.t.∀t ∈ (L×Σ)∞
f(t) = PM,ζ,ξ({σ ∈ CPaths(M) | traces(σ) = t}) }
where PM,ζ,ξ is the probability measure in M under (ζ, ξ), and traceta extracts
from a path the sequence of tags and actions, i.e. traceta() =  (on the empty path
traceta gives the empty string) and traceta(q
`:a−→ σ) = ` : a · traceta(σ).
• We denote by Tracess(q) the safe traces of the automaton associated to a system q.
• Two systems q1 and q2 are safe-trace equivalent, denoted by q1 's q2, if and only
if Tracess(q1) = Tracess(q2).
The following example points out the difference between's and the standard (com-
plete) trace equivalence.
Example 3. Consider the TPAs of Example 2. The two TPAs have the same complete
traces. In fact Traces(S [a/sec]) = {τ · out〈a〉 , τ · out〈b〉} = Traces(S
[
b/sec
]
). On
the other hand, we have Tracess(S [a/sec]) = {f1, f2, f3} where f1({1, 2} : τ · 2 :
out〈a〉) = f2({1, 3} : τ · 3 : out〈b〉) = f3({1, 4} : τ · 4 : out〈a〉}) = 1, and fi(t) = 0
otherwise (for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}), while Tracess(S
[
b/sec
]
) = {f1, f2, f4} with f1, f2 as
above, and f4({1, 4} : τ · 4 : out〈b〉) = 1, f4(t) = 0 otherwise.
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5.2 Safe Bisimilarity
In this section we propose a security-safe version of strong bisimulation, that we call
safe bisimulation. This is an equivalence relation stricter than safe-trace equivalence,
with the advantage of being a congruence. Since in this paper schedulers can always
observe which component is making a step (even a silent step), it does not seem natural
to consider weak bisimulation.
We start with some notation. Given a TPAM = (Q,L,Σ, qˆ, α), and a global sched-
uler ζ, we write q a−→ζ µ if there exists σ ∈ Paths?(M) such that ζ(σ) 6= ⊥,
(ζ(σ), a, µ) ∈ α(q), and q = last(σ). Note that the restriction to ζ still allows non-
determinism, i.e. there may be µ1, µ2, such that q
a1−→ζ µ1 and q a2−→ζ µ2 (with either
a1 = a2 or a1 6= a2).
We now define the notion of safe bisimulation. The idea is that, if q and q′ are
bisimilar states, then every move from q should be mimicked by a move from q′ using
the same (admissible) scheduler.
Definition 6. Given a TPA M = (Q,L,Σ, qˆ, α), we say that a relation R ⊆ Q × Q
is a safe bisimulation if, whenever q1R q2, then enab(q1) = enab(q2), and for all
admissible global schedulers ζ forM such that ζ(σ1) = ζ(σ2) whenever last(σ1) = q1
and last(σ2) = q2:
• if q1 a−→ζ µ1, then there exists µ2 such that q2 a−→ζ µ2 and µ1Rµ2, and
• if q2 a−→ζ µ2, then there exists µ1 such that q1 a−→ζ µ1 and µ1Rµ2,
where µ1Rµ2 means that for all equivalence classes X ∈ QRˆ, we have µ1(X) =
µ2(X), where Rˆ is the smallest equivalence class induced byR.
The following result is analogous to the case of standard bisimulation:
Proposition 1. The union of all the safe bisimulations is still a safe bisimulation.
Therefore the largest safe bisimulation exists, and coincides with the union of all
safe bisimulations. We call it safe bisimilarity, and we denote it by ∼s.
Given two TPAs on the same L and Σ, M1 = (Q1, L,Σ, qˆ1, α1) and M2 =
(Q2, L,Σ, qˆ2, α2), we can define bisimulation and bisimilarity across their states, i.e.
as relations on (Q1 ∪Q2), in the obvious way, by constructing the TPA M with a new
initial state qˆ and two transitions to δqˆ1 and to δqˆ2 , respectively.
Given two components or systems, q1 and q2, we will say that q1 and q2 are safely
bisimilar, denoted by q1 ∼s q2, if the initial states of the corresponding TPAs are safely
bisimilar. Note that q1 ∼s q2 is possible only if q1 and q2 have the same number of
active components, where “active”, for a component, means that during the execution
of the system it will make at least one step. Note that in the case of components, or
of systems constituted by one component only, safe bisimulation and safe bisimilarity
coincide with standard bisimulation and bisimilarity (denoted by ∼), respectively. This
is not the case for systems, as shown by the following example:
Example 4. Consider again the TPAs of Example 2. As pointed out in the introduction,
we have S [a/sec] ∼ S
[
b/sec
]
. However S [a/sec] 6∼s S
[
b/sec
]
. To show this, let us
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construct a new TPA (as described before) with initial state qˆ such that qˆ `:τ−→ S [a/sec]
and qˆ `:τ−→ S [b/sec]. Now consider the (admissible) global scheduler ζ such that
ζ(σ)
def
=

` if σ = qˆ,
{1, 4} if σ = qˆ `:τ−→ S [a/sec] ,
2 if σ = qˆ
`:τ−→ S [a/sec] 1,2:τ−→ ( − || out〈a〉 || − || − ),
3 if σ = qˆ
`:τ−→ S [a/sec] 1,3:τ−→ ( − || − || out〈b〉 || − ),
4 if σ = qˆ
`:τ−→ S [a/sec] 1,4:τ−→ ( − || − || − || out〈a〉 ),
{1, 4} if σ = qˆ `:τ−→ S [b/sec] ,
2 if σ = qˆ
`:τ−→ S [b/sec] 1,2:τ−→ ( − || out〈a〉 || − || − ),
3 if σ = qˆ
`:τ−→ S [b/sec] 1,3:τ−→ ( − || − || out〈b〉 || − ),
4 if σ = qˆ
`:τ−→ S [b/sec] 1,4:τ−→ ( − || − || − || out〈b〉 ),
⊥ otherwise.
It is easy to see that S
[
b/sec
]
cannot mimic the transition 4 : out〈a〉 produced by
S [a/sec] using the same scheduler ζ.
It turns out that safe bisimulation is a congruence with respect to all the operators
of our language, as expressed by the following theorem. (Statements 2(a) and 2(b) are
just the standard compositionality result for probabilistic bisimulation.)
Theorem 1.
1. ∼s is an equivalence relation.
2. Let a ∈ Σ and A,B,B′ ⊆ Σ. Let p1, . . . , pn be probability values, and let
q, q1, q2, . . . , qn, q′1, q
′
2, . . . , q
′
n be components.
(a) If q1 ∼s q2, then a.q1 ∼s a.q2, q1 + q ∼s q2 + q, (a)q1 ∼s (a)q2,
and q1 | q ∼s q2 | q.
(b) If q1 ∼s q′1, . . . , qn ∼s q′n , then
∑
i pi : qi ∼s
∑
i pi : q
′
i.
(c) If (B) q1 ‖ . . . ‖ qn ∼s (B′) q′1 ‖ . . . ‖ q′n, and f n(q) 6∈ B ∪B′, then
(A ∪B) q1 ‖ . . . ‖ q ‖ . . . ‖ qn ∼s (A ∪B′) q′1 ‖ . . . ‖ q ‖ . . . ‖ q′n.
The following property shows that bisimulation is stronger than safe-trace equiva-
lence, like in the standard case.
Proposition 2. If q1 ∼s q2 then q1 's q2.
Like in the standard case, the vice-versa does not hold, and safe-trace equivalence
is not a congruence3.
3 This is because we are considering the complete traces.
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6 Safe Nondeterministic Information Hiding
In this section we define the notion of information hiding under the most general hy-
pothesis that the nondeterminism is handled partly in a demonic way and partly in an
angelic way. We assume that the demonic part is in the realm of the global scheduler,
while the angelic part is controlled by the local scheduler. The motivation is that in a
protocol the local components can be thought of as programs running locally in a single
machine, and locally predictable and controllable, while the network can be subject to
attacks that make the interactions unpredictable.
We recall that, in a purely probabilistic setting, the absence of leakage, such as no-
interference and strong anonymity, is expressed as follows (see for instance [5]). Given
a purely probabilistic automaton M , and a sequence a˜ = a1a2 . . . an, let PM ([a˜])
represent the probability measure of all complete paths with trace a˜ in M . Let S be
a protocol containing a variable action secr , and let s be secret actions. Let Ms be
the automaton corresponding to S[s/secr ]. Define Pr(a˜ | s) as PMs([a˜]). Then S is
leakage-free if for every observable trace a˜ , and for every secret s1 and s2, we have
Pr(a˜ | s1) = Pr(a˜ | s2).
In a purely nondeterministic setting, on the other hand, the absence of leakage has
been characterized in the literature by the property S[s1/secr ] ∼= S[s2/secr ], where ∼=
is an equivalence relation like trace equivalence, or bisimulation. As we have argued in
the introduction, this definition assumes an angelic interpretation of nondeterminism.
We want to combine the above notions so to cope with both probability and nonde-
terminism. Furthermore, we want to extend it to the case in which part of the nondeter-
minism is interpreted demonically. Let us first introduce some notation.
Let S be a system containing a variable action secr . Let s be a secret action. Let
Ms be the TPA associated to S[s/secr ] and let (ζ, ξ) be a compatible pair of global and
local schedulers for Ms. The probability of an observable trace a˜ given s is defined as
Prζ,ξ(a˜ | s) = PMs,ζ,ξ([a˜]).
The global nondeterminism is interpreted demonically, and therefore we need to en-
sure that the conditional of an observable, given the two secrets, are calculated with re-
spect to the same global scheduler. On the other hand, the local scheduler is interpreted
angelically, and therefore we can compare the conditional probabilities generated by
the two secrets as sets under different schedulers. In other words, we have the freedom
to match conditional probability from the first set with one of the other set, without
requiring the local scheduler to be the same.
Either angelic or demonic, we want to avoid the clairvoyant schedulers, i.e. a sched-
uler should not be able to use the secret information to achieve its goals. For this pur-
pose, we require both the global and the local scheduler to be admissible.
Definition 7. A system is leakage-free if, for every secrets s1 and s2, every admissi-
ble global scheduler ζ, and every observable trace a˜, {Prζ,ξ(a˜ | s1) | ξ admissible
and compatible with ζ} = {Prζ,ξ(a˜ | s2) | ξ admissible and compatible with ζ}.
The safe equivalences defined in Section 5 imply the absence of leakage:
Theorem 2. Let S be a system with a variable action secr and assume S[s1/secr ] 's
S[s2/secr ] for every pair of secrets s1 and s2. Then S is leakage-free.
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Note that the vice versa is not true, i.e. it is not the case that the leakage-freedom
of S implies S[s1/secr ] 's S[s2/secr ]. This is because in the definition of safe-trace
equivalence we compare the set of probability functions (determined by the schedulers)
on traces, while in the definition of leakage-freedom we compare the set of probabili-
ties of each trace, which may come from different functions. This additional degree of
freedom generated by the local scheduler helps the system to obfuscate the secret, and
provides further justification for the adjective “angelic” for the local nondeterminism.
From the above theorem and from Proposition 2, we also have the following corol-
lary (with the same premises as the previous theorem):
Corollary 1. If S[s1/secr ] ∼s S[s2/secr ] for every pair of secrets s1 and s2, then S is
leakage-free.
7 Related Work
The problem of deriving correct implementations from secrecy specifications has re-
ceived a lot of attention already. One of the first works to address the problem was
[18], which showed that the fact that an implementation is a consistent refinement w.r.t.
a specification does not imply that the (information-flow) security properties are pre-
served. More recently, [2] has proposed a notion of secrecy-preserving refinement, and
a simulation-based technique for proving that a system is the refinement of another.
[11] argues that important classes of security policies such as noninterference and aver-
age response time cannot be expressed by traditional notion of properties, which consist
of sets of traces, and proposes to use hyperproperties (sets of properties) instead. [14]
addresses the problem of supervisory control, i.e, given a critical system G that may
leak confidential information, how to design a controller C so that the system G|C dos
not leak. An effective algorithm is presented to compute the most permissible controller
such that the system is still opaque w.r.t. a secret.
Concerning angelic and demonic nondeterminism, there are various works which
investigate their relation and possible combination. In [4] it is shown that angelic and
demonic nondeterminism are dual. [19] uses multi-relations to express specifications
involving both angelic and demonic nondeterminism. There are two kinds of agents, de-
monic and angelic ones, and there is the point of view of the internal system and the one
of the external adversary. [22] considers the problem of refining specifications while
preserving ignorance. While the focus is on the reduction of demonic nondeterminism
of the specification, the hidden values are treated essentially in a angelic way.
The problem of the leakage caused by full-information schedulers has also been
investigated in literature. [6] and [7] work in the framework of probabilistic automata
and introduce a restriction on the scheduler to the purpose of making them suitable to
applications in security protocols. Their approach is based on dividing the actions of
each component of the system in equivalence classes (tasks). The order of execution
of different tasks is decided in advance by a so-called task scheduler, which is history-
independent and therefore much more restricted than our notion of global scheduler.
[3] proposes a notion of system and admissible scheduler very similar to our notion of
system and admissible global scheduler. The main difference is that in that work the
components are deterministic and therefore there is no notion of local scheduler.
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The work in [9,8] is similar to ours in spirit, but in a sense dual from a technical
point of view. Instead of defining a restriction on the class of schedulers, they provide
a way to specify that a choice is transparent to the scheduler. They achieve this by
introducing labels in process terms, used to represent both the states of the execution
tree and the next action or step to be scheduled. They make two states indistinguish-
able to schedulers, and hence the choice between them private, by associating to them
the same label. We believe that every scheduler in our formalism can be expressed in
theirs, too. In [8] they also consider the problem of defining a safe version of bisimu-
lation for expressing security properties. They call it demonic bisimulation. The main
difference with our work is that we consider a combination of angelic and demonic
nondeterminism, and this affects also the definition of bisimulation. Similarly, our def-
inition of leakage-freedom reflects this combination. In [8] the aspect of angelicity is
not considered, although they may be able to simulate it with an appropriate labeling.
The fact that full-information schedulers are unrealistic has also been observed in
fields other than security. First attempts used restricted schedulers in order to obtain
rules for compositional reasoning [12]. The justification for those restricted schedulers
is the same as for ours, namely, that not all information is available to all entities in the
system. However that work considers a synchronous parallel composition, so the setting
is rather different from ours. Later on, it was shown that model checking is unfeasible in
its general form for the restricted schedulers in [12] (see [16] and, more recently, [15]).
Despite of undecidability, not all results concerning such schedulers have been negative
as, for instance, the technique of partial-order reduction can be improved by assuming
that schedulers can only use partial information [17].
8 Conclusion and Future work
We have observed that some definitions of security properties based on process equiva-
lences may be too naive, in that they assume the scheduler to be angelic, and, worse yet,
to achieve its angelic strategy by peeking at the secrets. We have presented a formalism
allowing us to specify a demonic constituent of the scheduler, possibly in collusion with
the attacker, and an angelic one, under the control of the system. We have also consid-
ered restrictions on the schedulers to limit the power of what they can see, and extended
to our nondeterministic framework the (probabilistic) information-hiding properties like
non interference and strong anonymity. We then have defined “safe” equivalences. In
particular we have defined the notions of safe trace equivalence and safe bisimilarity,
and we have shown that the latter is still a congruence. Finally, we have shown that the
safe equivalences can be used to prove information-hiding properties.
For the future, we plan to extend our framework to quantitative notions of informa-
tion leakage, possibly based on information theory. We also plan to implement model
checking techniques to verify information hiding properties for our kind of systems. A
natural candidate for the implementation would be PRISM. Of course, we would need
to restrict the class of schedulers in PRISM so to meet the admissibility criteria.
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